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"Are you better off today than you were 
four years ,ago?" "Will you be better off four 
years from now?" These questions are asked 
prior to almost any national election. It is dif-
ficult to frame a positive answer to these ques-
tions when one views the economic perform-
ance of the last two decades. The 1980s have 
witnessed a stark leveling off of productive 
investment and, hence, productivity growth. 
This has been accompanied by increasing rates 
of both inflation and unemployment while eco-
nomic policies seem unable to ameliorate one 
without worsening the other. Although the 
current rate of unemployment is as low as it has 
been in 15 years and the inflation rate is also 
moderate, this has been accomplished at the 
enormo~s cost of well over one trillion dollars 
of deficit spending during the past seven years. 
The need for an innovative policy is undeni-
able; perhaps there is a better way. Profit shar-
ing might be able to provide the cure for "stag-
flation"- the simultaneous occurrence of 
stagnation and inflation. 
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To evaluate the potential benefits of profit 
sharing, I will first review the history of profit 
sharing in America. Next, I will explain the 
macroeconomic benefits that could be derived 
from a profit sharing economy of the type pro-
posed by Martin L. Weitzman, an MIT economist 
Following this I will present a case study of the 
Dupont Co., which has recently employed a 
profit sharing system. Finally, I will analyze 
some criticisms of Weitzman's theory and make 
suggestions for future research on a "share 
economy." 
History of Profit Sharing 
Historically, profit sharing has gone through 
varying phases of popularity. It first received 
serious attention in 1889 in several books by 
J.P. Gilman and was proposed as a means of 
conquering the social ills resulting from indus-
trialization. Gilman also established the Asso-
ciation for the Promotion of Profit Sharing in 
1892 and identified 34 firms which employed 
profit sharing plans (Gilman, pp. 386-87). This 
organization was important in its role as the_ 
first concerted effort to introduce profit shar-
ing to the public. Following its introduction, 
profit sharing received considerable attention 
during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. Its main function was to serve as a 
mechanism to avert labor unrest and thus aid 
in avoiding the establishment of unions. The 
number of plans did increase slightly between 
1910 qnd 1920. However, a study by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics could still only find 
approximately 60 plans in existence in 1916 
(Emmet, p. 9). Moreover, the term profit shar-
ing itself was used loosely during this period. It 
was defined as any payment beyond that of a 
cash wage, such as fringe benefits, bonuses or 
pension plans. Few of the so-called profit shar-
ing firms actually paid wages based on the 
firm's profits. 
With the coming of the Great Depression, 
there was a decrease in the relatively small 
number of profit sharing plans already in exis-
tence. This was due mainly to the large number 
of business failures. In the late 1930s, though, 
profit sharing enjoyed a revival, .as noted in a 
U.S. Senate survey of 1939 entitled "Survey of 
Experiences in Profit Sharing and Possibilities 
of Incentive Taxation." And according to the 
Vandenberg Herring Subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Committee on Finance, 728 of 9,000 firms 
surveyed employed some form of profit sharing. 
Most were only pension or bonus programs 
bearing little direct relationship to profits, how-
ev~r. But the survey declared profit sharing to 
be associated with "labor peace, employee se-
curity and business success" (Senate Finance 
Subcommittee, pp. 159-60). The Senate's sur-
vey also created greater interest on the part of 
both management and the public in profit shar-
ing, and convinced Congress to pass legisla-
tion giving a tax advantage to those companies 
using profit sharing plans. During World War 
II, ! profit sharing continued to receive a fair 
amount of attention. The Federal Government 
was attempting at the time to control wages, 
and thus encouraged the use of deferred profit 
sharing plans. 
The number of plans continued to rise 
from the late '40s until the early '70s when a 
decline in stock market values caused a slow-
ing in the rate of establishment of new plans 
34 
(Latta, p. 18). In periods of uncertain market 
conditions, employers tend to oppose risk tak-
ing. For many companies profit sharing was a 
relatively new phenomenon and thus was per-
ceived to involve considerable risk. By 1978, 
though, the trend had once again reversed 
itself and the number of profit sharing plans in 
existence reached a record high number of 
28,634. 
As noted earlier, J.P. Gilman was the first 
to describe some of the socially beneficial effects 
of profit sharing on the economy. But it was 
not until the mid-1960s that a new theory of 
profit sharing was expounded. An economist 
named Jaroslav Vanek proposed that by lower-
ing the wage rate and giving workers additional 
income based on the profits of the firm, profit 
sharing could actually increase the level of 
employment. This would in tum cause the 
share of national income going to labor to 
increase. There would then be an increase in 
aggregrate demand resulting from the high 
propensity for workers to consume the portion 
of profits which had been distributed to them. 
This process would, finally, stimulate capital 
formation and technological advance, causing 
an increase in the country's rate of economic 
growth (Nuti, pp. 18-21). In this way Vanek 
provided the foundation for Weitzman's idea of 
the "share economy." 
The Share Economy 
Until recently, there has not been much 
attention devoted by economists to profit shar-
ing theories. In the midst of "Keynesian" ver-
sus "supply side" economics and the usual 
concerns about the relationship between un-
employment and inflation, profit sharing has 
been viewed mainly as a tool to improve pro:-
ductivity and labor-management relations. How-
ever, in his book The Share Economy, Martin 
L. Weitzman proposes profit orrevenue sharing 
as an almost certain path to full employment 
and as a vigorous policy to combat inflation. 
The simultaneous existence of the twin 
spectres of inflation and unemployment is a 
relatively new (i.e., post Vietnam War) threat to 
the economy. The fiscal and monetary policies 
developed by John Maynard Keynes are no longer 
effective in an era of stagflation. Keynes sub-
scribed to the classical economic theory that 
unemployment meant that the wage rate was 
too high. However, he refused to believe a 
market economy was self-regulating and that 
all that was needed was time for Adam Smith's 
"Invisible Hand" to slowly bring wages into 
balance with full employment. Keynes, being 
fully aware of the stickiness of wages, encour-
aged government fiscal and monetary policy to 
drive unemployment down. In the develop-
ment of his policies, he paid little attention to 
inflation, assuming, as did his contemporaries, 
that inflation would be negligible until full 
employment was reached. 
Today, the Keynesian cure for unemploy-
ment can be viewed as an anachronism. His 
demand-side approach to lowering unemploy-
ment is for the government to pursue an ex-
pansionary policy: an increased money supply, 
low interest rates, high government spending 
and/ or low taxes. This approach lowers unem-
ployment but can give the stagflation pen-
dulum a shove in the other direction, resulting 
in a cost-push, wage-price spiral and the con-
comitant dramatic rise in inflation. 
As is well known, inflation redistributes 
wealth, a benefit to some (e.g., holders of fixed 
rate loans) and a detriment to others (e.g., re-
tirees). Further, the entire economy must bear 
the burden of added information costs due to 
monetary uncertainty and a foreshortened fi-
nancial planning horizon. In the United States, 
the electorate abhors inflation almost as much 
as it abhors recession and unemployment. The 
government, always operating with the next 
election in mind, is necessarily committed to 
fighting both. And since the basic causality of 
stagflation is poorly understood (it is possibly a 
serious long term side effect of Keynes' full 
employment prescription), victory is elusive. 
Weitzman proposes that stagflation can-
not be fought on the macroeconomic level. 
Recognizing the macro failures, he advocates 
action at the micro level and calls for "micro-
political reform ... and the institution of in-
centives to induce better output, employment, 
and pricing decisions at the level of the firm" 
(Weitzman, p. 27). Most economists realize ag-
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gregate microeconomic policy can have a sig-
nificant effect on the macroeconomy, but 
question whether it can be the predominant 
factor. 
In response, Weitzman reviews the deci-
sion processes followed by profit-maximizing 
firms and the coordination processes of a market 
economy. The decision process can be simply 
stated in three steps. First, a firm selects the 
profit maximizing level of its output such that 
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. 
Second, a sufficient amount of labor is hired to 
produce the selected output level. Finally, price 
is set by multiplying marginal cost by some fac-
tor related to the price responsiveness (elas-
ticity) of demand. As such, the price markup is 
usually quite low when the quantity sold is 
very responsive to the selling price of a product 
(elastic demand). Conversely, the markup fac-
tor will be considerably higher for a product 
with an inelastic demand (Weitzman, p. 17). 
Based on these decisions, a firm has es-
sentially two alternatives when faced with a 
decrease in demand for its product. It can cut 
prices to the level at which production can be 
maintained or it can cut production. The first 
alternative normally leads to significant losses 
for the firm. However, in a market economy, the 
traditional and usually necessary response to 
demand fluctuations is to vary quantities, not 
price. It naturally follows that if production is 
cut, workers will lose their jobs. Similarly, if 
production costs rise, prices must also rise and 
quantities sold will decrease. Again, output 
must decrease and workers are laid off. In a 
wage system, laying off workers is the only 
option open to firms when there is a produc-
tion cutback. 
A logical conclusion drawn from the above 
discussion is that the demand for labor varies 
directly with the demand for a firm's output. 
This is due to the condition that in a competi-
tive wage economy the marginal cost of labor 
(cost of one additional unit of labor) is equal to 
the marginal revenue product of labor (revenue 
from the output of one additional unit oflabor). 
Now consider what would happen in the same 
firm if an invisible hand suddenly changes the 
firm's method of worker remuneration from a 
wage system to a "share system," with workers 
receiving part of their salary in wages and part 
in a year-end bonus based on profits. In a share 
system, there is no necessity for the firm to 
lower its output in the event of a decline in 
demand. Instead, guided by the elasticity of its 
product demand, it lowers prices to a point 
where the output level can be maintained. Nat-
urally, lower prices mean lower profits, and 
worker compensation must thereby be reduced. 
As such a share economy does not put workers 
out on the street. In fact, in Weitzman's share 
system, the marginal cost of labor is less than 
the marginal revenue product of labor, and as a 
result there is always an excess demand for 
labor! (Weitzman, p. 23). 
It is immediately obvious that in a share 
firm, compensation is inversely proportional to 
the level of employment. Of course, this would 
be hard on the firm's labor force if it were the 
only share firm in town. But if all firms par-
ticipated in a share system, "something like a 
balanced expansion of the economy would take 
place with increased demand from higher 
spending of newly employed workers feeding 
back to keep prices, revenues per worker, and 
labor remuneration more or less steady .. . 
[while] the economy ... [goes] to a higher em-
ployment level" (Weitzman, p. 88). This is the 
crux of the Weitzman theory. 
Before addressing inflation, I will present 
a short numerical example which should drive 
home the efficacy of the share system. In a wage 
system, if a firm incurs a 10 percent decrease in 
demand, the usual response is to cut output by 
10 percent. Of course, this means that the firm 
will lay off approximately 10 percent of its 
workforce and will also suffer a 10 percent loss 
of revenue and profits. In a share economy, 
however, the response would be markedly 
different. 
Let us say that the firm manufactures a 
product whose price elasticity of demand has a 
magnitude of -3. As noted previously, elas-
ticity is a measure of the price responsiveness 
of changes in the quantity demanded of a par-
ticular product. It is the percentage increase 
(decrease) in the number of items sold that 
would result from a one percent decrease (in-
crease) in the price. The quantity demanded 
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can be brought back to its original level by 
lowering price by a percentage equal to the 
decrease in demand divided by the price 
elasticity: 
Price Cut= 10% + 3 = 31h% 
Thus full output is maintained and employee 
compensation would be reduced by an amount 
determined by whatever profit sharing formula 
is used- but by no more than 3YJ percent in 
any case. Although Weitzman states that a pre-
cise formula for total compensation is the sub-
ject of further study, he uses as an example a 
worker compensation package of which % is 
fixed wages and YJ share wages (wages de pen-
dent on the degree to which profit goals are 
met). With this package, the effect of the price 
cut described above is a decrease of3YJ percent 
of the YJ share-only 1.1 percent of total com-
pensation. This 1.1 percent loss in total com-
pensation can be compared to the 10 percent 
loss (by layoff) which would be suffered by the 
aggregate workforce in a traditional wage sys-
tem should demand fall by 10 percent (Weitz-
man, pp. 100-107). 
Finally, a brief word about inflation is 
appropriate. Weitzman postulates that with 
full employment guaranteed by the expected 
excess demand for labor in a share economy, 
the government has more freedom to pursue 
anti -inflationary policies. It can do so relatively 
assured that its action will not cause unem-
ployment. In addition, aggregate wage flex-
ibility is desirable in itself because it eliminates 
the stickiness experienced in a wage economy. 
As such, the economy's self-correcting mech-
anism is allowed to function more efficiently, 
thereby automatically moderating inflation (a 
truly dexterous invisible hand). 
A Case Study of a Profit Sharing Plan: 
DuPont 
Many companies are just now discovering 
how powerful a mechanism profit sharing can 
be in improving productivity. These include 
General Motors, Ford, USX, Hewlett Packard 
Co., AT&T, and DuPont Co. (Schroeder, p. 134). 
In this section, I will focus on DuPont as a case 
study. In 1989, DuPont will begin a profit shar-
ing plan in its fibers division. DuPont is an 
extremely aggre;sive competitor in the chemi-
cal industry, and its fibers business is one of its 
most profitable divisions with profits in 1987 of 
$624 million. DuPont is the first company of its 
kind to introduce such a plan of great size dur-
ing a time when profits are high and growing 
rapidly. It plans to tie the wages of all its workers, 
from the hourly worker to the vice president of 
its fibers business, directly to the company's 
profitability. 
The plan will work in the following man-
ner. Base salaries will be cut by 6 percent as 
compared to those of workers doing the exact 
same jobs in DuPont's other areas of business. 
If the fibers business achieves 100 percent of its 
profit goals, the workers will recoup this 6 per-
cent. If the unit meets less than 80 percent of 
its goals, the entire 6 percent difference will be 
lost. If the group meets exactly 80 percent of its 
goals, the employees will receive a 3 percent 
increase in salary. On the other hand, during 
profitable times, if the fibers group meets 150 
percent of its goals, employees will receive a 
maximum increase of 18 percent. 
To use a concrete example, a manager 
earning $94,000 in the fibers business has a 
counterpart elsewhere in the company earning 
$100,000. The manager in the fibers business 
will earn $100,000 only if the fibers group 
achieves its anticipated profitability goal. If 
profits are less than 80 percent of the level 
originally forecast, the manager stands to lose 
$6,000 and will only earn $94,000. If on the 
other hand the group meets 150 percent of its 
original goal, the manager will gain an extra 
$12,000 in wages and have a total salary of 
$112,000. When one considers DuPont's wage 
bill, the profit sharing plan will mean a savings 
of $36 million if less than 80 percent of the 
profitability is achieved and a $72 million payout 
in cash bonuses if 150 percent of the goal is 
realized. With after-tax operating profits of 
$624 million in 1987, a 4 percent increase in 
profits is expected over the next 5-10 years. 
Profitability goals in future years will be set 
according to these figures (excluding inflation). 
The extra pay earned will be distributed in 
February of the following year rather than being 
paid as increases in base salary. The 'fibers group 
workers will in fact receive raises in salary just 
as their counterparts in DuPont's other busi-
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ness, but fibers group raises will represent only 
94 percent of all others. In other words, a 6 per-
cent base pay difference will be maintained 
(Hays, p. A4). 
The plan encourages employees to work 
harder, but it also allows them to share in the 
benefits of their extra labor. The purpose is to 
convince employees that they have a stake in 
the business and that they can as individuals 
affect the company's production capacity. 
Workers may, for example, find ways to elimin-
ate material waste or save on repairs that would 
be needed on equipment. Management-worker 
communication is thus central to the success 
of the plan. It is extremely important that the 
employees understand that they are not receiv-
ing a pay cut in disguise. 
The pay cut does, in fact, help keep down 
labor costs in a recession. According to the Profit 
Sharing Research Foundation, it also helps 
workers to perform better, allows turnover rates 
to decline, and makes wages more flexible 
(Schroeder, p. 134). In one study of small man-
ufacturers, it was concluded that companies 
using profit sharing plans had a 10 percent 
higher average productivity growth rate than 
that of competitors who did not use profit shar-
ing plans. Those companies using profit shar-
ing plans also had V3 fewer layoffs because 
during economic downturns their labor costs 
contracted automatically (Schroeder, p. 136). 
Of course, profit sharing does involve consider-
able risk, but the benefits are undeniable. Work-
ers and management alike are asked to share in 
this risk and are given the incentive to "watch 
the bottom line." Profit sharing thus fosters a 
feeling of cooperation between employee and 
employer as both work together to improve 
productivity. 
Criticisms of the Share Economy 
It has been difficult to find a ground swell 
of support for Weitzman in the economic com-
munity. Some of his strongest supporters are 
Robert Solow, who states that The Share Econ-
omy is "marvellous," and James Meade, who 
praises Weitzman's book as "important, stimu-
lating, readable and persuasive." However, most 
reviewers of Weitzman's book have tended to 
be at best ambivalent. Their usual responses 
seem to be that Weitzman's profit sharing 
scheme will not be accepted by either labor or 
management and that, in any case, it cannot 
drive the economy to full employment while 
containing inflation. 
Critics make a valid point regarding worker 
opposition to a share economy. That is, workers 
will demand to participate in decision making. 
The demand for co-determination of wages 
between workers and management, for exam-
ple, would cause considerable debate and could 
possibly lead to employee determined ratios of 
share wages to fixed wages. Weitzman has rec-
ognized this possibility and has stated that co-
determination must be avoided. It should be 
noted that empirical studies of cooperative 
firms reveal no evidence in favor of this because 
this tendency is probably offset by workers 
realizing they are gaining other advantages 
such as job security (Nuti, p. 28). This evidence, 
however, does not sway the critics from advo-
cating co-determination in decision making. 
Another reason why workers may not ac-
cept a share economy is that they are already 
accustomed to a system of fixed wages. In fact, 
wage rigidity is a "legitimate" desire of both 
risk-averse employees and risk/ profit oriented 
employers (Rothschild, p. 209). Workers have a 
need for a dependable source of income, and 
many use income as an indicator of their posi-
tion on the corporate ladder. Some critics feel 
that, from the employer's point of view, there is 
a need for fixed wages in order to establish a 
hierarchy within the company. 
Still another theoretical objection to 
Weitzman's proposal has significant credibility. 
It is the uncertainty that, in the face of economic 
difficulties, firms will actually follow the 
Weitzman formula and lower their prices, thus 
causing an increase in cash balances and an 
increase in demand. In fact, it is widely held 
that even in the face of prosperity firms will be 
tempted to replace the popular game of tax 
avoidance and evasion with "wage avoidance 
and evasion." There is the potential that firms 
will exploit the risk aversion of workers and 
experiment with alternate pay formulas until 
they drive the share portion to zero, thereby 
returning completely to a wage economy (Nuti, 
p. 23). 
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However, some criticisms of Weitzman's 
share economy seem unfair or misguided, and 
some are even based on misinterpretations of 
what he has actually said. For example, Weitz-
man has been criticized fornotofferingspecific 
values for what proportion of the wage is to be 
fixed and what proportion is to be share-deter-
mined. Yet Weitzman repeatedly emphasizes 
that the "ideal" compensation formula is yet to 
be developed. Other critics argue that stagfla-
tion will not be eliminated if the number of 
firms implementing a share system is not large. 
In reality, though, there is no basis for this 
criticism since Weitzman specifically states the 
need for an essentially economy-wide share 
system of wages if his plan is to be effective. 
In spite of the criticism and doubts about 
a share system's macroeconomic benefits, most 
critics temper their criticisms by at least admit-
ting the need for further research and analytic 
evaluation of The Share Economy. Many feel 
that unemployment poses such a grave threat 
to the U.S. economy that any potential remedy 
should be seriously considered (Blinder, p. 51). 
The added job security which Weitzman's plan 
promises might well provide greater efficiency 
and productivity, greater social equality, and 
less resistance to technical change. Weitzman's 
plan is undoubtedly socially beneficial but it 
must be proven privately beneficial as well. 
Workers (especially those with seniority) must 
be convinced of the benefits because it is they 
who will assume most of the risk. Even then, a 
share economy would probably require govern-
ment sponsored incentives along with govern-
ment oversight of implementation. 
A Proposal for Future Research on the 
Share Economy 
The share economy is worth continued 
serious study as a means to full employment 
without inflation. There are four key areas to be 
more fully addressed: the compensation for-
mula and its microeconomic effects, the atti-
tudes of workers, the macroeconomic effects, 
and the implementation process. 
The selected method of compensation is 
the key to initiating a share economy and de-
termining its microeconomic effect on the firm. 
Weitzman's example assumes a linear relation-
ship between output and the number of workers, 
and it does not address the additional overhead 
and required capital to support each extra hour 
of labor. In addition, he assumes a constant 
value for demand elasticity. I would recom-
mend the development of a model of various 
profit-and/ orrevenue-sharing formulas which 
include capital, output, and revenue. This model 
should be related to the number of workers and 
based on a demand elasticity function supported 
by empirical data. 
In addition, the attitudes of workers must 
be carefully considered. Management must be 
successful in shaping the psychological well-
being of workers in convincing them that the 
share system is not a pay cut in disguise. Em-
ployers must also educate workers on how the 
system would work and perhaps even let them 
have a voice in setting profitability goals. Fur-
thermore, employers might consider offering 
job guarantees, which would secure a worker's 
job for a specified period of time, as a way to 
compensate workers for assuming compensa-
tion risk. 
The share economy would seem to have 
the best chance of working if the entire work-
force were involved in the production of goods. 
However, a major part of the U.S. labor force is 
engaged in the service sector; and the demand 
for services is somewhat price inelastic. For 
example, consider the demand for the services 
of people who repair televisions, refrigerators, 
and other appliances. Since there are only a 
certain number of appliances in need of repair 
at any given time, a decline in the price of repair 
costs will have little or no effect on demand for 
the service. 
A final matter which must be taken into 
consideration is the implementation process 
used. To make profit sharing attractive to both 
owners and workers, Weitzman proposes a tax 
break for those companies and workers par-
ticipating in profit sharing plans. This could 
have a dramatic negative effect on the govern-
ment's budget in the short run due to a de-
crease in tax revenues. Ideally, the increase in 
employment might eventually stimulate the 
economy enough to compensate for the loss of 
tax revenue. Unfortunately, Weitzman's pro-
posed full employment economy could take a 
while to come about. In any case, an incentive 
must be considered with regard to its mac-
roeconomic effect. 
Conclusion 
There is little doubt that a share economy 
holds considerable promise- higher employee 
morale, improved labor-management relations, 
and an employee sense of "ownership." It also 
has been postulated by such noted economists 
as Sir John Hicks that wage flexibility, a cor-
nerstone of the share economy, is desirable per 
se. Nevertheless, there are serious doubts as to 
its acceptability to labor and management, 
along with considerable debate about its mac-
roeconomic effect The theory which Weitzman 
proposes is attractive, but in practice it may be 
difficult for both labor and management to 
accept this theory on a sufficiently large scale. 
If a way is found to implement the plan, however, 
the net result could be "more economic pros-
perity and social progress than are to be found 
in the wildest visions of national planners or 
cultural revolutionaries" (Weitzman, p. 146). 
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